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WE-2 Comments on
Proposed Policy Requirements

a. NSC Policies

1. Regarding the 5th and 6th paras. under section A:

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a. It is assumed that the national psychological warfare programs referred to in the 5th para. would include propaganda, political action and economic warfare.

b. In the 6th para., it is not clear whether or not revelation of U. S. Govt participation is intended, nor is it clear whether public knowledge of U25X1C participation is advocated. In no instance that can be foreseen in [REDACTED] the latter believed to be advisable or necessary. It is understood that cleared indigenous contract agents generally know that they are working for the U. S. Govt. It is not clear in 6th para to whom U. S. participation should be revealed nor why such a policy is believed advisable.

(Note: Last para under section A: There is no indication from available info on NSC pronouncements that NSC has forbidden use of "Titoism". This was decision on OPC policy level - 23 Jan'51.

It is difficult to believe that a decision at NSC level is necessary.)

b. Interdepartmental Policies:

2. In the 3rd para. of section B:

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a. Assume "retardation" is intended instead of "Retaliation".

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*This is
one
aspect
There are
other aspects*

3. In the 4th para. of section B: It is assumed that Wartime sabotage target selection is intended. If so, a policy determination and implementation would be very helpful for planning sabotage stay-behind nets in the Low Countries.

4. Regarding the last para in section B:

Is the assignment to a single agency of responsibility for both overt and covert economic warfare intended? This would seem to be the case, since a distinction is not made in the referenced statement.

c. Internal Agency Policies

1. Regarding the proposals on economic warfare for policy consideration, it is not clear whether the assumption has been made that aggressive NSC and inter-departmental policies on economic warfare have been established including attempt to deny non-strategic items to the Soviet area.

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3. Does the requirement for policy guidance on the extent to which CIA peacetime clandestine planning can become operational prior to the outbreak of war apply only to an alert period prior to anticipated Soviet launching of an aggressive war? Is it intended that stay-behind assets would be utilized? If so, this again raises the question of a unilateral U. S. decision to utilize assets not under unilateral U. S. control.

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